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Background: An important avenue toward a proper ‘energy transition’ through regional and local projects is for
government to collaborate with private sector organizations. In the energy sector, these latter organizations are
often already involved in private-private partnerships for collaboration toward energy transition. This article focuses
on the energy governance question whether in fact some of these forms of collaboration actually are about public
governance, as they effectively lean on government involvement. This seems to be the case in the construction of
biogas infrastructures for the production and distribution of green gas. This contribution discusses, on the basis of
the case ‘Biogas grid Noordoost Fryslân’, if such collaboration should in fact be labeled as public-private partnership
(PPP). In the energy governance discourse, this issue is important because in the organization of PPP, the public
interest of energy transition comes with specific normative safeguards, originating in public law.
Methods: This article provides a legal normative assessment on the basis of a specific case, the Biogas grid
Noordoost Fryslân. The relevant empirical data on this case is gathered by a document study, including research
reports, policy plans, project documents, and by interviews. Experts from the Dutch energy sector were face-to-face
interviewed by a semi-structured questionnaire. The analysis uses the concept of PPP in relation to public authority.
Results: On the basis of a confrontation between the results from literature and from the results of empirical case
study of a biogas grid in the Dutch region Noordoost Fryslân, we conclude that governmental influence can take a
‘disguised’ form by ‘quasi’ private organizations, with major normative consequences for the mode of sustainable
energy governance.
Conclusions: Administrative law in particular poses (binding) criteria for safeguarding public interests, such as on
transparency, relevant also to the mode of governance applied in the promotion of renewable energy. Public standards
for governance of renewable energy projects have to be sufficiently safeguarded, as regards their form and content of
steering, while at the same time retaining the advantages, which ensue from private party involvement within PPP.
Keywords: Public-private partnerships (PPP); Energy transition and green gasBackground
Green gas
In 2020, 16% of the national energy consumption in the
Netherlands has to be from renewable resources [1]. In
this respect, Dutch public officials have positive expecta-
tions about the developments of biogas in rural areas
[2]. Biogas is produced out of biomass, for example,* Correspondence: m.a.heldeweg@utwente.nl
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in any medium, provided the original work is pfrom anaerobic manure digestion. In Dutch rural areas,
many farmers and agricultural contractors have invested
in co-digestion plants to generate energy from the anaer-
obic digestion of manure, by converting biogas in heat
and electricity. Farmers can utilize this energy themselves,
but from a societal perspective, it is far more attractive to
upgrade the biogas to a higher heat content biomethane
(85% to 90% methane), which can be injected into the nat-
ural gas grid [2]. In the Netherlands, this is known as
‘green gas’ [2]. As half of the Dutch energy consumption
concerns natural gas (45 billion Nm3 per year), it isis an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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roperly credited.
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ergy transition step by exploiting the opportunities of re-
gional production and distribution of green gas [3].
Biogas infrastructures in rural areas are essential to
make large-scale production and distribution of green
gas possible [4]. Such pipelines connect the co-digesters
on the barnyards with a central place where the biogas is
upgraded to the quality standards of natural gas and is
injected in the regular gas infrastructure [2]. In many re-
gions of the Netherlands, such as De Peel, Salland en
Noordoost Fryslân, the possibilities of realizing a biogas
grid are being explored.Challenges for energy governance
Currently, there is no legal mandate for government to
establish biogas grids - by itself or in collaboration with
others. In practice, public and/or private sector organi-
zations are interdependent if they want to get the com-
plex undertaking of production and distribution of green
gas going [5]. Collaboration between these types of orga-
nizations, however, does not develop spontaneously and
has to be organized in mutually agreed partnerships.
When collaboration and interdependence are a shared
concern of public and private actors, we enter the dis-
course on public governance [6,7]. From this discourse,
we know that public governance has moved beyond the
image of government uni-centricly steering society as an
‘unmoved mover’, toward sharing responsibility in a
multicentric and interactive way, across different polity
layers and between various public and private actors
[8-10]. The institutional design of PPPs clearly relates to
this interactive scope [11] and is the focal point of this
contribution, especially with respect to ‘hidden ways’ of
government involvement and the subsequent need for
public interest safeguards in partnership interaction with
private parties on sustainable energy.
In the Dutch energy sector, there are forms of collab-
oration, which at first sight manifest as partnerships be-
tween private organizations only. These associations
appear to be about merely private interests and about
‘private-private partnership’ as no government party
seems to be involved at all. Upon closer inspection, how-
ever, these forms of seemingly mere private collaboration
de facto also lean upon some disguised form of active
public interest input as guided by government. Never-
theless, the set-up of such partnerships and the under-
standing that parties involved seem to have of the
relevance of this public element in their collaboration do
not display a concern for adherence to (norms originat-
ing in) public law - while the empirical fact of govern-
ment guidance may be regarded as strongly indicative of
such normative concerns. As a matter of, broadly speak-
ing, legitimate governance, this factual state of affairs,understood as a particular type of collaboration, calls for
a normative analysis of such governance concerns.
The focus is on examples of collaboration in unregu-
lated, (more or less) experimental projects concerning
the construction of regional biogas pipelines. These net-
works are planned to connect distributed biogas produc-
tion to a central location, where the biogas will be
upgraded to green gas and then injected into the natural
gas grid [2]. The main organizations that are involved in
such initiatives are (i) biogas producers, (ii) energy com-
panies, and (iii) gas grid operators. All of these organiza-
tions are private law legal persons. However, it seems
that in this type of collaboration, the gas grid operators
are not involved on the basis of their privately defined
societal interest, but rather on the basis of the public
interest of the production and distribution of renewable
energy, as - ultimately - defined by the central govern-
ment. aIn this article, we present the view, on the basis
of the regional case of Biogas grid Noordoost Fryslân,
that because of such public orientation and of public in-
fluence, what appears as mere private collaboration and
so as a mode of private energy governance (i.e., of pri-
vate actors coordinating their actions regarding their in-
terests in energy supply), should in fact be labeled as
hybrid energy governance - of private and public actors
coordinating their actions regarding energy supply thus
including concern for public interests next to concern
for private interests. If so, this collaboration amounts to
PPP as hybrid governance, given the involved public
interest in the energy transition as promoted authorita-
tively by one or more de facto public parties to the PPP,
and so (norms originating in) public law may become
relevant. This is important as a matter of energy govern-
ance because upon such a state of hybrid PPP affairs,
the process of energy transition may also be guided
(through the organization and operation of PPP’s) by
public norms and underlying public values and interests.
Methods
Research methods
In answering the research question, we analyze the term
PPP against the backdrop of the key concept ‘public au-
thority’. The concept of public authority is of importance
to the juridical qualification of (the functioning of ) pub-
lic sector organizations - as follows from the rule of law
principle that public authorities ‘… must exercise powers
conferred to them in good faith, fairly, for the purpose
for which the powers were conferred, without exceeding
the limits of such powers and not unreasonably’ [12].
This legal analysis will be applied to the results of our own
empirical case study. From December 2011 until February
2012, we studied the regional case of Biogas grid Noor-
doost Fryslân (in Dutch: Biogasleiding Noordoost Fryslân;
henceforth BIONOF). The empirical data is gathered by a
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and project documents and by studying recent publica-
tions and new items. Besides the document study, we
gathered empirical data by (anonymous) interviews. We
spoke with 14 key actors from the energy sector, including
policy advisors, directors of energy companies, directors
of gas grid operators, and business developers. These re-
spondents were selected on the positive expectation that
they were able to provide useful information about the na-
ture and the way of the collaboration. A further six
stakeholder-respondents were selected and interviewed on
the basis of their functional involvement in the actual
BIONOF project. They were face-to-face interviewed by a
semi-structured questionnaire. The results of the inter-
views were included in interview reports, which were sub-
mitted for approval.
Upon combining the results from the study of relevant
literature with results of empirical case study of BIO-
NOF, we conclude that governmental influence can take
a veiled form by ‘quasi’ private organizations involved in
what looked to be mere private but in fact is hybrid col-
laboration. As a matter of good energy governance (i.e.,
coordination of action concerning energy supply that is,
next to effective and efficient, legitimate), this calls upon
all parties concerned to take into account the values and
norms that are relevant to safeguarding public interests.
Not only does this involve general public values, such as
openness, transparency, certainty, integrity, and distribu-
tive justice and rule of law but also more specific energy
supply-related values, such as accessibility, affordability,
reliability, safety, and sustainability - the acknowledge-
ment of which will depend on authoritative articulation
within the given polity. Public values and norms are thus
relevant also to the promotion of renewable energy and
have to be complied with, while at the same time retain-
ing the advantages, which ensue from the collaborative
character of PPP. Good energy governance is a hybrid
governance challenge.
In normative terms, the findings relate to BIONOF, but
in a way that displays a general rule, that ‘once the camel’s
nose gets inside the tent rapidly becomes uncomfortable’,
i.e., once government is involved, legal norms apply, ori-
ginating in public law and impacting on the set-up of the
PPP-arrangement at hand. This general rule also applies
to all other instances of (regional or other) PPP where,
similar to BIONOF, the ‘legal fact’ of government involve-
ment is the case.An analytical framework for PPP
The dominant view in the literature is that PPP is an
ambiguous term signifying a so-called container concept
[13], and some even speak of ‘the PPP phenomenon’ as
‘an enigma’ [14]. Given the multitude of interpretationsof PPP, it makes little sense to here present the PPP def-
inition. We have chosen for what we believe to be a
minimal but robust definition, providing a description of
no less and no more than the ontologically necessary
and sufficient three basic elements (public, private, and
partnership) in the most straightforward way and as
such suitable to assess the nature of relevant existing
actor partnerships in the Dutch energy sector [15].
Not every interaction between government and private
actors can be regarded as PPP. PPP is a specific form of
collaboration, in which government and private actors
interact on an issue of public interest. As such, we take
PPP as an institutionalized form of policy interaction, re-
spectively an arrangement between (one or more) orga-
nizations from the public sector and (one or more)
organizations from the private sector. This means we
make a distinction between the characteristics of PPP
and those of other, more noncommittal interactions be-
tween government and private actors. Three cumulative
characteristics are especially important [15].
Firstly, the collaboration should be focused on the
realization of public policy. Within the partnership, the
public interest has to be represented authoritatively by,
at least, one public actor [16]. It makes no difference
whether the initiative to collaborate comes from a public
actor or a private actor, as long as there is continuous
involvement of government, which ensures the coopera-
tive focus on attaining a public interest. The public actor
in the PPP is (inescapably) embedded in public law,
which adds to an adequate political legitimacy for the
PPP as a whole [16].
Secondly, to actually achieve the policy goals, active in-
volvement of private actors is necessary [16]. The aim of
this involvement is to secure the input of resources by pri-
vate organizations. They can contribute, for instance, by
providing financial resources, technical expertise, or entre-
preneurship or by enhancing social support. While gov-
ernment assumes dependency of public policy success on
private actor participation, private actors consider their
contribution to reaching policy goals to be beneficial
in achieving their own goals, such as making profit.
So, there is a jointly and mutually actively supported
strategy that reflects a convergence of underlying in-
terests [16].
Thirdly, PPP is an institutional arrangement of policy
interaction. This means that there is a legally structured
partnership between government and private actors [4].
This criterion excludes nonreciprocal, mere incidental,
and noncommittal interactions between government and
private actors. Interaction should involve action that is
legally speaking from one entity - both ‘internally’, on
the basis on agreed internal decision-making rules, and
‘externally’, as regards relations to third parties. Exam-
ples of legal structures that imply mutual obligations are
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panies, and participation in public bodies. Each legal
structure provides a structural organizational context in
which a partnership can develop [16].
The characteristics above can be brought together in
the following definition of PPP:
PPP is a legally structured partnership between one or
more public authorities and one or more legal entities
under private law that focuses on the development and
implementation of a joint strategy for the execution of a
policy project [11].
This definition points our attention to the fact that under
PPP, governance of public interests takes place in a partner-
ship that comes with mutual and reciprocal obligations of
the parties involved. From the outset, the partnership dic-
tates a specific format for the determination and/or imple-
mentation of involved public and private interests as
pursued by the public and private partners. Considered
from a private law perspective, such a form of consensual
self-regulation is a well-established practice - contracts are
everywhere and they deal with all kinds of subjects. From a
public law perspective, however, to ensure legitimacy in the
pursuit of public interests by contract only is problematic -
especially because while contracts ‘include’ parties (as a
legal regime inter partes), they also ‘exclude’ others (as a
matter of privity of contract), whom are thus without ‘voice’
and vulnerable to seeing their interests harmed consequen-
tial to the PPP (such as a conventional manure treatment
company that may lose out on resource once farmers sign
onto a biogas grid). Given our definition of PPP, we need to
consider if, also considering the specific institutional en-
vironment in which such PPP is applied, this type of
collaboration is legitimate from a public values and
norms perspective. We consider such legitimacy to be
one of the building blocks to good energy governance
in the form of public-private collaboration - aside from
other forms (e.g., public service, public ownership, and
regulation).
Results
Our findings firstly relate of the why and how of gas
grids such as that of BIONOF. Next, we present our first
analysis of whether the BIONOF project is in fact an in-
stance of PPP. This then leads to a second, more focused
analysis on the issue of authoritative public representa-
tion within PPPs (especially that of the BIONOF-type).
Finally, we outline our findings as regards the basic sys-
tem concerning the applicability of (norms originating
in) public law to actors with a private legal form.
Biogas grid Noordoost Fryslân
Noordoost Fryslân is a sparsely populated area in the
north of the Netherlands, which currently faces concern
over its agricultural sector [17].More generally, the Dutch agricultural sector is con-
fronted with a policy dilemma between the importance
of a profitable farming business and the importance of
preventing an excessive environmental burden to the
rural environment. The latter is due to the increased
productivity of farms, engaging in global market competi-
tion [18] meanwhile causing considerable adverse envir-
onmental effects, such as soil acidification [19]. In recent
years, farmers and interest groups are looking into
emission-neutral business operations, to be achieved ul-
timately in 2030 [20]. This ambition is also supported by
local governments and has become part of their public pol-
icies including that of the province of Fryslân, also as
regards the development of the northeast region of Fryslân
[17], such as by the initiative to converting biomass in bio-
gas for the production and distribution of green gas, for
which a biogas grid called the BIONOF grid, must be
established.
Converting biogas to green gas is a new link in the en-
ergy supply from the gas production chain. For the
BIONOF-project, this production chain has the follow-
ing links: (i) purchasing, (ii) cleaning, (iii) transporting,
and (iv) upgrading and delivering [21]. The green gas
production chain starts with the purchase of biogas by
the operator of the pipeline. This means that biogas pro-
duction is not included in BIONOF. The co-digestion
plants should be understood as autonomous units. One
of the principles of the project is that the biogas pro-
ducers are responsible for the functioning and operation
of the plant in the yard. Once the operator has become
the owner of the biogas, the cleaning process starts. This
is done by removing, inter alia, CO2. Then, the com-
pressed biogas is injected into the pipeline and trans-
ported to a central location [21]. There, the biogas is
upgraded to green gas and then injected into the natural
gas grid. From the natural gas grid, the energy resource
will be delivered as green gas to the end-users. The 32-
km biogas pipeline has a capacity of 10,000 m3 green gas
per hour [21]. The grid design has been completed, and
construction will begin once the subsidy for construction
is granted by the state [21].
Various parties are involved in the BIONOF project.
Their involvement is organized in two chains. The ‘pri-
mary chain’ in BIONOF consists of the parties that are
of vital importance to the technical realization of pro-
duction and delivery of green gas. Farmers and farming
companies (‘producers’), energy supply companies, and
grid operators are members of this primary chain.
The ‘secondary chain’ in BIONOF consists of parties that
(merely) support the green gas project and have committed
to its realization. A large private engineering consultancy
firm, the province of Fryslân, the municipality of Leeuwar-
den (i.e., the provincial capital of Fryslân), the ‘Gas Unie’
(i.e., the leading Dutch producer of natural gas), and
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stakeholders - for-profit and not-for-profit stakeholders)
are members of this chain.
It is important to know that, following changes in
Dutch energy law (in 2006), production and supply of
energy (especially gas and electricity) have been sepa-
rated from energy transport - mainly to safeguard grid
reliability [22]b whereas energy companies used to com-
bine these functions; since 2011, production and supply
companies operate independently from companies in-
volved in transport. According to current Dutch statutes
on gas and electricity supply, the grid operators are re-
sponsible for the construction, management, and main-
tenance of public energy grids. However, as we shall see
later, there is a legal difference in the position of grid op-
erators as regards their regulated tasks concerning the
public energy grids and their possible tasks (or involve-
ment) in unregulated private of public-private grids,
such as the BIONOF grid.
First analysis - PPP or not?
To determine the relevance of public law norms as cri-
teria of good energy governance through the BIONOF
type of collaborative action, we need to analyze if and
how the public interest in sustainable energy (projects)
influences decision-making in the aforementioned two
chains. As far as the secondary chain is involved, clearly
there is a public interest at stake because public parties
have engaged in support of activities in the primary
chain. When we look at the primary chain, the picture is
less clear. Given that all concerned parties are private
law legal persons, perhaps the conclusion would have to
be that this is a chain of private-private partnership and
therefore no public interest is involved other than that
this arrangement for private-private interaction has sup-
port from a chain that also builds upon public interest. In
terms of good energy governance, especially considering
that public law norms are activated when public interests
are at stake, we need to determine more accurately the na-
ture of collaboration in both BIONOF chains - each on its
own and both together.
As mentioned above, we listed the three conditions of
our working definition of PPP: 1. focus on realization of
public policy, represented by at least one public party; 2.
active involvement (by securing resources) of at least one
private party; 3. an institutional arrangement in the form
of a legally structured partnership. As a first step, we
should look at these conditions more closely in respect of
the primary and secondary chains in our BIONOF case.
1 Focus on realization of public policy, authoritatively
represented by at least one public party
In general terms, of the case as a project, the three basic
public energy interests to be considered are affordability,reliability, and sustainability [23]. Although private par-
ties initiated the BIONOF project, clearly it touches on
these public values and as such public involvement, if
only through the secondary chain, makes good sense.
In the secondary chain, the public policy angle has in-
deed come with involvement by public parties - i.e., a
municipality and the province. As such, the first condi-
tion of PPP is met.
With respect to the primary chain, this is a more diffi-
cult issue. None of the parties has a public character to
the extent of being endowed with public legal powers. In
such a quality, parties would be able to unilaterally and
bindingly determine the legal position of others and thus
actively and coercively pursue the public energy interest.
Then again, there may be other shades of public that
display less of a command and control (i.e., ‘government’)
approach to policy-making, but more one of cooperating
with and convincing of others (i.e., ‘network govern-
ance’), but still with ‘public law significance’. The latter
significance would be at stake when certain parties (at-
tempt to) influence private party behavior, by a claim to
‘public voice’ (i.e., to speak on behalf of the public inter-
est), doing so by use of ‘public means’ (e.g. information,
knowledge, time, workforce, capital, office space) and
with possible ‘public effects’ (i.e., on others in their pri-
vate interests and/or on the public at large in terms of
the interest served). If such public law significance is the
case and if at least one party can claim to authoritatively
represent this public (energy) interest, then we could
consider its collaboration with private parties as PPP
and if and how it may be affected by (norms originating
in) public law. Before actually presenting a more in-
depth analysis on public law significance, we should,
however, first establish that at least the second and third
PPP conditions are met (while assuming that the first
condition is met both as regards the primary and the
secondary chain) - or else there would be no relevant
partnership to discuss.
2 Active involvement (by securing resources) of at least
one private party
In general terms - of the case as a project - it was clear
from interviews that most of the private parties involved
are ‘in it’ for their private profit. At the same time, their
involvement is vital to bringing together the necessary fi-
nances, technical expertise, entrepreneurship, and com-
mitment (if only to provide the prime resource: manure).
The interviews also revealed that the private parties in-
volved consider the project to be relevant to achieving the
public interest of enhancing the use of green gas and that
they consider this interest to be in alignment with their
own private interest.
As such, we may conclude that both in the primary
and in the secondary chains, there is clear and active
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interest objectives, so that the second condition to PPP
is also met.
3 An institutional arrangement in the form of a legally
structured partnership
In general terms, of the case as a project, it is clear that
the dual arrangement of two chains builds on two com-
plementary but - legally speaking - rather different rela-
tionships. We need to determine their nature as this
third condition is about separating informal, noncom-
mittal, and discrete interactions from true partnerships.
As regards the secondary chain, the legal structure is
that of a declaration of intent (‘Intentieverklaring’) be-
tween the parties named in the above (signed on 5 Feb-
ruary 2010) [24]c. Such a declaration clearly falls within
the realm of so-called covenants or gentlemen’s agree-
ments. These are pseudo-contractual agreements that, at
least in the Netherlands, became popular since the
1960s of the twentieth century and were meant to tie to-
gether strategic and sometimes also operational behavior
of both public and private parties, by mutual agreement
[25]. It was believed that cooperation could in some
cases yield better policy results than achievable through
‘command and control’. The lack of legal enforceability,
given that these agreements generally were rather more
about ‘making an effort’ than promising specific results,
was (supposedly) substituted for the expectation that mu-
tually agreed obligations would, as a matter of self-or co-
regulation, bring a greater willingness to reach mutually
agreed objectives (or upon default, suffer the consequence
of ‘naming and shaming’, or ‘ostracism’). According to
our research, the members of the secondary chain clearly
had no intent of any ‘meeting in court’ upon default by
any of the participants. This already begs the question if
the secondary chain can, upon reflection, qualify as a PPP.
In legal terms, the third condition seems questionable as
it is, at its most, rather of a ‘soft law’ nature. We will not
pursue a definite answer on this issue, but believe that
given the ‘network characteristics’ of the second chain (be-
ing mainly about strategic coordination, in support of the
primary chain), and the influence that it has upon factual
commitment, that a declaration of intent can be regarded
as a type of ‘legally structured relationship’ and so we can
qualify the secondary chain as a PPP.
As to the primary chain, this displays the characteristics
of a ‘business deal’, if only given that the parties involved
have a profit interest and/or are investing resources in es-
tablishing the green gas grid. From the interviews, it be-
came clear that as soon as the biogas grid is operational,
the parties involved will sign private law contracts and
juridical persons will be established. Contracts will be
signed, on one hand, between the energy supply com-
panies and the biogas producers, between the energysupply companies and the grid operators and on the
other hand, between the two involved grid operators. In
the latter contract, both involved grid operators will act
as one legal entity as they will form one company that
handles the exploitation of this particular biogas grid.
Prior to these ‘hard’ legal arrangements, so prior to the
grid being operational, all concerned parties have
signed a memorandum of understanding, to the effect
of making efforts to establish the grid and including the
formats of the aforementioned contracts. From this
state of affairs, we can deduce, that prior to the start of
operations, the legal structure of the partnership is
more of a soft law character (with limited legal signifi-
cance) but upon the start of operating the grid, there is
a clear hard law business deal in the form of legally
binding contracts and a specific juridical person on the
side of the involved grid operators - clearly meeting the
third condition of being a PPP, clearly expressing legal
implications with a bearing on the involved partici-
pants, with possible external effects on others.Second analysis - authoritative representation of the
public energy interest
Our concern for good energy governance is focused on the
possible need to safeguard public (law) values and norms
behind the public energy interest in green gas projects.
Consequently, we need to determine if the BIONOF type
of collaboration does, in its primary chain, qualify as PPP,
especially if the first condition of PPP (i.e., ‘publicness’) is
being met, as a matter of authoritative representation of
the public energy interest by one or more parties involved.
Given that the private interest parties in the primary
chain are clear (i.e., the farmers, the energy supply com-
pany), our focus of attention as to the ‘authoritative pub-
lic voice’ in this chain is on the grid operators (Enexis
and Stedin). They both are private law legal persons, but
perhaps there is more of a public interest involved than
meets the eye.
How do we determine the existence of an ‘authoritative
public (energy) interest representation’? Our perspective
follows the approach of the Dutch Scientific Council for
Government Policy [26]. A public interest is a societal
interest, relevant to society as a whole - not merely to
some individual(s) - for which government takes on the
(final) responsibility, executed on the basis of public policy
objectives, in the conviction that it can only thus be served
properly (as this may not be expected spontaneously from
markets or civil society).
Consequently, we need to look for government (in PPP)
if we want to determine if indeed the public interest is au-
thoritatively represented. Unfortunately, the definition of
government is by no means settled. We have chosen to
use the legal concept of ‘public authority’ as a point of
Heldeweg et al. Energy, Sustainability and Society  (2015) 5:9 Page 7 of 12reference, as this provides a conceptualization of govern-
ment both in terms of function (of various types of organi-
zations acting in service of public interests) and of norm
applicability (of general public law, such as human rights
and principles of proper administration).
The legal definition of ‘pure public authority’ points at the
existence of a ‘public legal mandate’ as a conjunction of: d
1. Statutory power - as an exclusive legal power, not
available to all (as opposed to the power to
contract), to unilaterally perform legal acts with
general bindingness. This highest form of legislative
power is generally reserved for public legal persons,
such as state bodies (e.g., parliament, departments),
provinces, and municipalities. This is not to say that
these (or others) pure public authorities can only
perform public law acts. They too need to acquire
facilities (i.e., utensils - e.g., computers, office space),
for which they need to also perform private law acts.
2. Public scope - to fulfill a government function, with
a general scope (not just a specific private group)
and on the basis of public funding, with assumed
service to the public interest only.
In liberal democracies, actions by pure public author-
ities are legitimate only if underpinned by democratic
consent and exercised under the rule of law. Hence, gen-
eral norms of public law (such as those mentioned in
the above - under ‘Research methods’ - e.g., good faith
and reasonableness) automatically apply to all pure
public authorities and do so in all their activities [27].
This stands to reason as the raison d’être of pure public
authorities is in their legislative function, so they intrin-
sically belong in the ambit of public law.
The assessment of whether a public interest is repre-
sented in PPP should not be limited to whether a legal
body with pure public authority is party to a PPP. Vari-
ous legal systems, such as the UK and the Netherlands,
also consider private law bodies without statutory pow-
ers but with public function to have public authority - as
functional public authorities.
Broadly speaking, we may distinguish between two
main groups:
1. Public or private legal persons (without statutory,
but) with delegated legislative or conferred
administrative legal powers (e.g., to grant subsidies
or allowances, apply sanctions, or issue permits) -
again exclusively allocated to them, and of a
unilateral nature.
2. Public or private legal persons without any
legislative or administrative powers, but with a
significant public function, following from two
possible underpinnings:a. A public law legislative mandate to fulfill a
particular public task (by performing private law
legal acts or factual and informational activities).
This may apply to both public and private legal
persons - the task of grid operators concerning
public electricity or natural gas grids, may typically
be an example (when there is a legislative mandate),
regardless of whether the grid operator is a public or
private law body.
b. Only as regards private law organizations, outside
legislative mandate (2a), various factors may point at
a public function [27]. Ultimately, these need to
‘provide proof ’ of an exclusive public interest task
performed within arms’ length of a public authority
of the abovementioned kinds (i.e., pure or 2a-
functional). Within arms’ length expresses that there
is a controlling, underlying public authority, by
virtue of ownership (shares), right of appointment of
governors, substantive (50 + %) funding, binding
policy guidelines, and/or ex ante supervision - as
opposed to a private organization being positioned
independently, at arms’ length; outside of
government control. These (‘within’) control
mechanisms need to (in conjunction) be sufficiently
strong to secure that the public interest scope, as
(broadly) understood by the underlying public
authority, is the leading objective in the operational
actions of the private body. In effect, control as
dominant empowerment and a strategic veto
power; with the capacity to bindingly influence all
operations - and as such moving beyond of what,
for instance, a regulator of competition oversight
would do. ‘Exclusiveness’ of the public interest task
is to say that serving this interest is not merely a
by-product of private interest or for-profit
activities, but is the leading objective. Exclusiveness,
generally, also expresses a monopoly position in the
performance of public interest activities, in that
these are dedicated specifically to service the public
interest - not to private interests or merely
consequentially. A private functional public
authority that provides grants for sustainable
energy projects may stand aside private banks or
private funds (acting on commercial or social
incentives) that offer similar services, but are not
(necessarily and certainly not formally) guided solely
by the public interest as viewed by the relevant
underlying public authority. Following this criterion,
private energy supply firms, commercially operating
on the Dutch liberalized energy market, do not have
functional public authority, but as regards private grid
operators in as much as involved in nonpublic grids
such as BIONOF, much will depend on whether they
operate with a public interest scope as determined by
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vis-a-vis public grid, their status as functional public
authority followed from 2a.
Because they lack public law legal powers, private bodies
are unable to unilaterally determine citizens’ freedoms (and
which would make them pure public authorities or func-
tional public authorities of the first kind), but they can use
private law powers (of contract and property) to allocate
funds (such as through private loans, donations, or allow-
ances), deliver services, perform technical services and
works, and provide information. If and when this is done
within arms’ length of an underlying pure public authority,
this expresses a public interest significance, as this involve-
ment then effectively comes with a dominant public voice
in how the private body is to perform its tasks. One could
argue that when public ties are indeed that strong, this sec-
ond type of functional public authority is about the exer-
cise of ‘quasi-public law (legal) powers’. To establish such
private bodies as public authorities may have diverse rea-
sons, such as of placing a task-organization outside of im-
mediate political control (and weighing of interests), of
internal efficiency, or of increasing the likelihood of attract-
ing outside private capital - quite aside from the fact that
reasons may be a temporary matter, following privatization,
while moving from a monopoly position toward being a
competitor on a liberalized market (as many energy supply
companies have done).
The below (Table 1) summarizes the (sub)types of
functional public authorities:
Functional public authorities (of both subcategories 1
and 2) are also assumed to automatically be obligated to
comply with all general norms of public law, but ‘only
when discharging a public function’ [27] - compare, for
example, the systematics of Article 6(5) Human Rights
Act 1998 [28] and Article 1:1, section 1, under b of the
Dutch General Administrative Law Act [29] This latter
limitation (only with a public function) is especially rele-
vant to the position of private law legal persons, as these
may have a hybrid character, and so also perform activ-
ities outside the public interest realm. In such a case, the
hybridity of these bodies does not refer to their legal
form (i.e. a private legal person with a public authority
status), but to their involvement in competitive marketTable 1 Types of functional public authorities
Functional public authorities: public or private law bodies
(both in categories 1 and 2)
1. With non-
statutory public
powers (lower
legislative or
administrative) -
unilateral
2. Without public law powers but
a. With legislative
mandate (public or
private bodies) - unilateral
b. Otherwise with
exclusive public interest
scope (only private body,
aside from 2a)transactions. The situation of grid operators not only
managing their (part of the) public grid, as regulated,
but also providing commercial/private grid services to
large companies is a clear example. Of course, in such
arrangements, the obligation to adhere to general public
law norms should be limited, so as not to interfere with
commercial activities - generally as an impediment.
As said, functional public authorities may be hard to dis-
tinguish from private public service companies (e.g., energy
supply companies) or voluntary NGOs (e.g., private green
certification or standardization organizations), active only
on markets or only in civil society networks respectively -
certainly when government holds shares in these private
bodies (as often in the process of privatization and
liberalization - merely to ensure that they are, commer-
cially speaking, properly launched) or subsidizes their ac-
tivities (as when government feels that an NGO adds to
the public policy objectives - merely upon the NGO’s free
willingness to commit to this activity). Clearly, however, as
these private legal persons have no (partial) functional pub-
lic authority, given that ultimately they operate out of a
private (commercial or societal) interest - even if their ac-
tivities (temporarily) align fully with public interest needs -
and so they are not automatically bound by general public
law rules.
Applicability of (norms originating in) public law
Our analysis has already revealed that public authorities,
pure and quasi/functional, automatically fall within the
public law scope, and consequently, their organization
and actions need to be in keeping with public law norms -
a normative state of affairs that may be recognized merely
as a matter of unwritten law, but which is sometimes also
explicitly prescribed by statute. This state of normative af-
fairs does, however, not exclude the possibility, that
(some) general public law norms are expressly (i.e., as op-
posed to automatically) made applicable to private bodies
without (any kind of) public authority, as from a public
interest viewpoint, their activities are considered too im-
portant and/or the market or network in which they func-
tion too vulnerable to perverse incentives. Although as
private actors, they are ‘naturally’ entitled to a broad range
of discretion in their actions, this range is expressly lim-
ited to avoid failure from the perspective of their actions
(potential) public interest contribution. Roughly speaking,
there are two ways by which any such express applicability
of norms of (or originating in) public law can be arranged:
a. Public legislation or regulation - by general
rules prescribing adherence to certain public law
norms, often either (1) in an act on particular
types of service organizations (e.g., societal
enterprises) or (2) in an act that regulates
transactions within a particular market (e.g.,
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networks of civil society (e.g., voluntary welfare/
care or cultural organizations and their clients or
target groups).
b. Mandatory public instructions - by order of an
underlying public authority, such as (1) conditions
in an administrative act that provides financial
means (e.g., a subsidy scheme) or (2) in a legal
agreement (e.g., contracts, covenants) with an
underlying principal body with public authority.
Aside from these legal arrangements, which follow
from a public interest perspective (that builds on
government concern), there is yet a third express
arrangement of
c. Private or self-regulation - by private law legal
persons which, merely by themselves or together
with others, commit to inter alia public law norms,
such as under a good governance code
(often under a ‘comply or explain’ regime).
So, altogether, there are three (a, b, and c) kinds of ex-
press public law arrangements that may compel not only
adherence to general public law norms (e.g., equality and
fair play) but also adherence to specific public law norms,
relevant to a particular area of service (e.g., reliability of
energy supply). The third type of (private) arrangement is
the ‘softest’ form of engagement to public norms, as it is
merely a private law arrangement (guided by private, com-
mercial or societal, interests, or concerns) - if indeed any
legal bindingness is involved. In the second type of ar-
rangement, the contractual instruction has a limited value
in the sense that the privity of contract rules out the possi-
bility of third party protection - unless explicitly arranged.
In all three cases, applicability of public law norms does
not make the private norm - subjects public parties - let
alone parties with public authority. Essentially, they areTable 2 Various ranges and the applicability of public law
Applicability of public law: categorizing public authorities, firms, and N
Actors ➔ Public authorities
Form and law Pure Quasi
1. Legal form a. Public law body b. Pub
2. Core determinant of form a. Statutory power + exclusive
public scope
b. Othe
3. Applicability general public law a. Yes, automatically and fully b. Yes,
(fully w
4. Applicability of special public law Yes, if so arranged - in service of a spe
a. Public services (e.g., energy, educatio
b. Public risks (e.g., environment, healthonly as a matter of their own private choice, involved in
societal interests that coincide with a public interest (as
defined by government). One can well imagine private en-
terprises and NGOs taking an interest in the promotion of
sustainable energy - either as a market opportunity, as a
matter of corporate social responsibility or as a core mis-
sion. This may even coincide and align perfectly with the
public interest that government may have in sustainable
energy. Crucially, however, these private initiatives are vol-
untary (and so may be abandoned freely) and they do not
(nor can they claim to) authoritatively express the public
interest, as the private actors may promote other alterna-
tives than government would prefer. Hence, they do not,
at least not automatically fall within the public law scope.
Table 2 summarizes the various ranges and the applicabil-
ity of public law:e
Discussion
On the basis of the above analytical results, we conclude
that within the primary chain of the regional case of
BIONOF, only the grid operators are possible candidates
for being the authoritative public interest authorities.
Only they may qualify as functional public authorities,
and so as government, whereas, for example, energy
supply companies do not (authoritatively) represent the
public interest, even though their function is vital to a
properly working energy market. Whether grid operators
in the BIONOF actually are functional public authorities
is a matter we will now discuss.
Authoritative representation of the public energy interest
As to the publicness of grid operators, the first thing to
note is that the grid operators in BIONOF are private
law legal persons, more in particular in the form of en-
terprises. They have a statutory task in the operations
and maintenance of the gas transport grid, but not inGOs
Markets and civil society
Firms and NGOs
lic or private law body c. Private law body/
natural persons
r public law powers c. (Not b and) d. Only private law powers
and interest scope
- Legislative mandate - On regulated market
(3c/4a to b)
- Exclusive public
interest scope
- On ‘free’ market
(but 4a to b)
automatically but partially
hen public body)
c. Only when specifically
arranged by 4
cific public interest
n, care, transport)
, safety)
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(see Articles 1(1)(d-e) jo. 2(1) jo. 10 Natural Gas Act).
Therefore, the statutory public safeguards apply to these
private law grid operators only when exercising explicit
public law tasks. The latter, however, is not the case in
the field of sustainable energy projects since in these
projects, grid operators have no regulated task. Such
projects are as yet unregulated, so there is no statutory
or regulatory underpinning that grid operators qualify as
functional public authorities - contrary to what could be
argued with respect to their position in operating the reg-
ulated main/public gas and electricity grids. In those cases,
clearly one can well argue that by virtue of their legal task/
obligations, they do have functional/quasi public author-
ity. We are, however, of the opinion that also with respect
to unregulated regional projects such as that of BIONOF,
grid operators may be considered to be positioned within
arms’ length of government and so be relevant, at least in
their actions, to (norms originating in) public law. In this
respect, two considerations are most relevant.
Firstly, but merely of an indicative nature, in 2011, the
Dutch department for Economic Affairs officially stated
that the increase of the share of energy generated re-
gionally would call upon grid operators to make the ne-
cessary grid investments given their statutory task of
safeguarding an efficient and reliable infrastructure [23].
In 2012, a legal provision was made in the Natural Gas
Act to allow for ‘sustainable decentralized experiments’.
Implementation of the new Article 1(i) is, however, still
awaiting the necessary ministerial decree to enter into
force. Meanwhile, aside from these (future) statutory provi-
sions, in the interviews, several respondents expressed the
opinion that the central government will expect grid opera-
tors to make an effort to support the policy ambitions as
regards climate and energy, such as by contributing to the
development of biogas infrastructures. While such expect-
ancy may not be irrelevant to actual behavior, it is a mere
factual state of affairs that cannot by itself make (norms
originating in) public law applicable.
Secondly, and crucially, the grid operators are owned by
provinces and municipalities, who together hold all shares
in them. From the interviews, it became clear that these
public shareholders opt for active ownership (pursuing
public policies through their ownership of shares), rather
than passive, where ownership is merely a means to bring-
ing a private enterprise in existence as a ‘public-task agent’
or safeguarding its existence (but not interfering in its ac-
tivities) [30]. When active, clearly public authorities influ-
ence grid operators to pursue a public interest scope as
the public owners see fit. Although the task is to-date un-
regulated, clearly in the BIONOF case, public ownership
in Enexis and Stedin is instrumental to the objective of
the energy transition and regarded as such by representa-
tives of grid operators but also by other PPP participants.Good energy governance
From this latter factual state of affairs, we conclude that
grid operators can and, if so, should indeed be regarded
as functional public authorities - even when operating in
the realm of unregulated regional experiments with
green gas, such as in BIONOF, because they authorita-
tively representing the public interest. Hence, we may
indeed label regional collaboration of the BIONOF type:
public-private partnership. Subsequently, the involved
grid operators are functional public authorities and
hence they are, regardless of the unregulated (regional)
realm in which they operate, automatically obligated to
adhere to general norms of public law. A normative state
of affairs that may be termed a logical consequence of
being an intrinsic part of a function which exclusively
determines the scope of a particular public interest - i.e.,
energy supply.f
Not only does this normative state of affairs influence the
position of grid operators themselves but also it conditions
the possible governance modes of regional cooperation
with other parties, some of which are intrinsically private.
The presence of a public party necessitates acceptance of
principle of good public governance on the PPP collabor-
ation, as only within the framework of a governance-
structure that upholds principles or elements such as the
rule of law, participation, responsiveness, consensus orien-
tation, equity, effectiveness and efficiency, accountability,
and transparency [31], collaboration between public and
private parties can develop and yield acceptable results;
without private interests pushing out public interests (or
necessarily vice versa). Thus, the structure of regional col-
laboration has to secure a proper weighing not only of gen-
eral public law values but also of specific public values
relevant to the energy field, such as viability, safety, reliabil-
ity, sustainability, and equal access - against the needs of
positive private involvement (fitting with a liberalized en-
ergy market).
Conclusions
Where collaboration between public and private parties is
used in an unregulated area as a means to make a much
desired smart and sustainable energy transition in regions,
applicability of public law values and norms nevertheless
calls for critical reflection on how this collaboration takes
shape, especially with a view on how public values and
norms are properly safeguarded in a framework of good
energy governance. This main conclusion follows from
the results of our research, which is based upon a nor-
mative, legal analysis, given the type example of the
BIONOF case. We believe this conclusion and the analysis
upon which it is built was necessary as the empirical study
of the BIONOF case revealed that respondents were un-
able to properly articulate the presumed grid operators’
public interest responsibility. Thus, the challenge was to
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ing, the case and, if so, what its consequences would be in
terms of normative requirements.
Applied to the BIONOF case, considered as a particu-
lar PPP type, we conclude that although grid operators
are private entities and BIONOF is about an unregulated
green gas experiment, grid operators are involved as
quasi/functional public authorities, effectively represent-
ing the public interest as perceived - in more or less spe-
cific terms - by underlying (pure) public authorities. As
such grid operators are automatically obligated to up-
hold norms of (or originating in) public law and PPP
collaboration should, as a matter of hybrid good energy
governance, reflect (also) these norms (as they present
themselves in the given legal polity). In instances of local
and regional transition to sustainable energy, private and
public stakeholders should be well aware of the particu-
lar (hybrid) position that the grid operators’ are in and
the particular legal demands and responsibilities that rest
upon them. In that sense, this contribution is about man-
aging expectations and promoting accountability to the
benefit of good (regional and local) energy governance.
These conclusions call for a further analysis on how PPP
relations in this type of collaboration should be organized
to further proper safeguards for (organizational) adher-
ence to such principles.g
Endnotes
aThe balance that gas grid operators must strike
between private and public interests is the subject of a
broader discussion - as observed, inter alia, by Steenhuijsen
and De Bruijne in their study of the role of energy network
companies in the energy transitions [32].
bAccording to the Statute on independent grid man-
agement (Wet onafhankelijk netbeheer (Won) - entered
into force in 2006), integrated energy companies were
under obligation to split off their grids for electricity and
gas from their production and supply activities before 1
January 2011 [33].
cSee the (only in Dutch language) publication ‘Eerste
groen gas hub in Nederland’ in the website: http://
www.energieraad.nl/newsitem.asp?pageid=20081 [24].
Unfortunately, the producers of biogas were not willing
to sign this document. It proved impossible to find out
during the interviews why they displayed this reluctance.
dWe take inspiration to the following from delibera-
tions over the concept of public authority over the 1998
Human Rights Act [27].
eTaken from a draft book by Heldeweg (Public govern-
ance law, an introduction to legal governance in the
regulatory state, forthcoming).
fIn Dutch Administrative Law, the definition of ‘public
office’ under the General Administrative Law Act
(Article 1.1 Awb) [29] is more limited than that ofPublic Authority in the UK 1998 Human Rights Act
[28] and does not (yet) encompass grid operators (see
the Explanatory Memorandum [34], sub 2.6, and a
2002 decision by the Administrative High Court for
Trade and Industry [35]). In view of a general clause
in the Civil Law code (Article 3:14 - ‘Civil law powers
may not be exercised in conflict with written or un-
written rules of public law’) and (related) case-law, we
feel that our stance (on grid operators) is radical but
not out of touch with the range of applicability of gen-
eral public law norms (fundamental rights, principles
of natural justice, and proper government) under
Dutch law.
gWith this contribution, we have elaborated upon our
views formulated in [36] and on the governance agenda
for energy transition in the Netherlands [37].
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